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Introduction
 The impact of science on today’s world 
has emerged in large part due to the work of 
universities in the UK. For the past several 
hundred years, the UK has forged the field 
into the acclaimed domain it is today, with UK 
universities nurturing the minds of notables 
like Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Isaac Newton, Niels 
Bohr, and Alan Turing. The prestige of the 
UK’s scientific program has drawn the best 
and brightest from all over the globe, leading 
to the island nation’s domination of modern 
science. Recent events, however, may threaten 
the continued success of the UK’s science, 
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) 
fields in higher education, all encompassed in 
the academic scientific community.
 With the entirety of the UK set to leave the 
EU in April 2019, many challenges to science 
at UK universities arise. Brexit portends a 
limiting of the freedom of movement essential 
to maintaining the high quality of UK scientific 
performance as well as a shift in research 
funding sources as the UK tries to find money 
to supplant that anticipated to be lost from 
EU collaborations. This article explores the 
consequences that could follow various Brexit 
outcomes on the movement of people and 
funds that fuel the UK’s university scientific 
research.
Pre-Brexit, 1996–2016
 From 1996 to 2016, the UK produced 
the third largest total amount of scientific 
documents and citations of any country in the 
world, following the United States and China; in 
particular, documents authored by at least one 
UK scientist were cited just under 61 million 
times in that period (Scimago Lab). Especially 
when considering the UK’s significantly smaller 
population size compared to the US and China, 
these statistics indicate that not only was the 
UK’s research workforce highly prolific but 
also the output was of a high enough quality 
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to garner a hefty number of citations. With 
a substantial volume of insightful scientific 
articles produced each year, the UK continues 
to prove itself a powerhouse of innovation and 
research.
 The outlook of scientific research in the 
UK post-Brexit, however, begins to change 
when examining the underlying details of these 
UK scientific documents. Yes, the UK produces 
copious cited articles. Yet, of these cited 
articles, about half of those published within 
the past decade are co-authored by at least one 
non-UK partner, of which more than 50% are 
EU partners (Frenk et al., 2016, pp. 14–15). 
This statistic is one sign of a strengthening 
partnership with both the global scientific 
community and the EU, as shown in Figure 
1. When internationally collaborative articles 
encompass this percentage of UK article output, 
international partners must therefore be 
credited with enhancing UK scientific prestige. 
 The rise of collaboration with EU 
partners meshes clearly with the growth of 
the EU’s Framework Programmes, run by 
the European Commission to fund research, 
technological development, and innovation 
in EU member states and global partners. 
The most recently completed Framework 
Programme 7 (FP7) ran from 2007 to 2013 
and contributed to research and development 
(R&D) by means of competitive grants. Over 
FP7’s seven-year period, the UK received €6.9 
billion in FP7 funding, an amount second only 
to Germany’s; the UK also received €1.9 billion 
of non-competitive structural funds from 
the EU (Frenk et al., 2015, p. 13). Therefore, 
in total, €8.8 billion of the EU’s €47.5 billion 
R&D expenditure across the 28 member states 
(EU-28) during FP7’s run went to UK scientists 
(Frenk et al., 2015, p. 12). Because 71% of 
this funding went to UK universities (Frenk 
et al., 2015, p. 18), STEM higher education is 
clearly a large and important beneficiary of EU 
investment.
 This success in garnering European 
support for scientific innovation is on track 
Figure 1
UK-based Article Publications by Partner
Source: Thomson Reuters Web of Science, cited in Frenk et al., 2016, p. 15.
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to continue through the EU’s eighth major 
Framework Programme, the 2014–2020 
program called Horizon 2020. In the most 
recent (2015) monitoring report for Horizon 
2020, statistics show that the UK remains 
an influential player in the EU’s scientific 
landscape. For 2015 projects, the UK marked 
the largest share of participation in signed 
grants from Horizon 2020, with 13.1%. 
Organizations based in the UK also received the 
largest share of Horizon 2020 funds for 2015 
projects, with 15.8% (European Commission, 
“Horizon 2020…,” pp. 210–11). The UK’s high 
receipt of funding and large participation 
continue a trend demonstrated in the first 
Horizon 2020 monitoring report (European 
Commission, “Horizon 2020…,” pp. 21–22). 
Indeed, this substantive participation in 
Horizon 2020 increased from the UK’s already 
notable involvement in the preceding FP7, 
marking the UK as a principal player in the 
EU scientific domain. In turn, collaborations 
and EU funding have a valuable impact on the 
nation’s research workforce and article output. 
The prolific success of citable UK scientific 
publications in the past few decades owes much 
to both collaboration with EU scientists and EU 
funding. 
 These indicators of the UK’s incredibly 
strong performance in the scientific domain, 
as well as UK STEM’s increasing reliance on 
international partners like the EU, are echoed 
in the performance of the nation’s universities. 
UK institutions dominate the list of the top 50 
university beneficiaries of Horizon 2020. In 
2015, the UK held the top three spots and overall 
had the most universities at 15 (European 
Commission, “Horizon 2020…,” p. 20). The 
UK similarly performs exceedingly well in the 
National Taiwan University (NTU) ranking, 
which takes into account a university’s current 
and past scientific articles alongside metrics 
like the number of citations. In the 2017 NTU 
ranking report, the UK had five universities in 
the top 50 and 36 in the top 500, far outpacing 
the rest of Europe and once again behind only 
the leading United States and China (“NTU 
Ranking…”). Discernably, UK universities 
contribute considerably to the UK’s status as a 
global frontrunner of scientific innovation.
 Similarly to how many UK scientific 
articles are co-authored by EU nationals, 
the EU plays a large role in the STEM-based 
success of UK universities. Figure 2 shows 
that, as of 2015, the UK university research 
workforce is highly international, where 28% 
Figure 2
UK Academic Scientific Workforce by Citizenship
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of academic staff and 51% of postgraduate 
students are non-UK citizens. EU nationals 
in particular comprise 16% of academic staff 
and 14% of postgraduate research students 
(Frenk et al., 2015, p. 8). With such a large 
portion of the research workforce coming from 
abroad, the ability to attract talent and funding 
from an international pool plays a large role 
in the success of UK universities. Dampening 
outside interest from joining the UK research 
workforce is therefore highly detrimental to 1) 
international collaborations and, in turn, the 
number of quality scientific articles the UK 
publishes, and 2) UK universities’ provision 
of high-level contributions to the scientific 
domain.
 Brexit challenges this portrait of an 
internationally driven UK scientific empire. 
In June 2016, when the UK voted 52 to 48 to 
leave the EU, a prevailing platform of populism 
and nationalism signified to the world that the 
UK is not a welcoming destination for foreign 
individuals. This perception leaves the UK’s 
university STEM sector, whose success pulls 
from an international work force, in a state of 
uncertainty. In addition, considerable research 
funding comes from participation in major EU 
innovation programs, many of which will be 
unavailable to UK scientists once they are no 
longer from an EU member state.
Brexit Negotiations and the Budget
 In a period of uncertainty for the country 
as a whole, the position of Parliament has 
done little to assuage concerns regarding 
the continued eminence of UK STEM higher 
education. When Prime Minister Theresa May 
called for a snap election that took place in June 
2017, UK political parties published manifestos 
detailing their visions for the UK during Brexit 
and beyond:
 •  The Labour Party, which wound 
up with 261 of the 650 members of 
Parliament, included in its manifesto 
that the UK should “ensure that the UK 
maintains [their] leading research role 
by seeking to stay part of Horizon 2020 
and its successor programmes and by 
welcoming research staff to the UK” as 
well as maintain membership in similar 
European organizations like Euratom 
and the European Medicines Agency 
(The Labour Party).
 •  The Scottish National Party, which 
earned 35 seats in Parliament, pledged 
to seek replacement funding for that 
lost from the EU by placing members 
of Scottish Parliament in parliamentary 
budgeting committees as well as to 
negotiate the continuation of programs 
that allow Scottish students to study 
anywhere in Europe (Scottish National 
Party).
 •  The Liberal Democrats won 12 seats 
and stated, “the Leave vote has already 
started to affect existing and proposed 
research programs.” The party pledged 
to “reverse the damage to universities 
and academics by changing the country’s 
course away from a Hard Brexit” (Liberal 
Democrats). 
 •  Yet, the party with the largest say in 
the Parliament at 316 seats, although 
not an absolute majority, is Prime 
Minister May’s Conservative Party. The 
Conservative manifesto never specifically 
addresses scientific research, although it 
does promise to secure entitlements of 
EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals 
in the EU, which would help continue 
collaborative scientific projects. The 
manifesto also indicates that “there may 
be specific European programs in which 
[the UK] might want to participate and if 
so, it will be reasonable that [Parliament] 
make a contribution” (The Conservative 
Party). 
 This hung Parliament—this Parliament 
without an absolute majority—is therefore 
most controlled by the party with the least 
clear intent to further academic and scientific 
interests. With the mammoth restructuring 
the Parliamentary budget must undergo to 
compensate for renegotiating vast numbers 
of trade deals, scientific research may not be 
high on Parliament’s list of funding priorities. 
Nevertheless, in light of both Brexit and 
general international trends, there are several 
indicators and warning signs as to why scientific 
development should be a focus of Parliament in 
finalizing Brexit talks.
 Over the course of FP7’s 2007 to 2013 run, 
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the €8.8 billion of EU research funding given to 
the UK made up only a slim 3% portion of the 
€226.3 billion that the UK spent on R&D, as 
shown in Figure 3 (Frenk et al., 2015, p. 17). 
This shockingly small percentage suggests 
that the EU contributes insignificantly to the 
overall picture of UK STEM higher education 
proficiency, thereby meriting Parliamentary 
budgetary discussions to ignore the loss of EU 
R&D funding. However, of that 3% sum, 71%, 
or €6.3 billion, went to academia. In further 
examining how funding was distributed across 
sectors, Frenk and colleagues (2015, pp. 17–18) 
found that business and industry received 64%, 
or €144.8 billion, of total expenditure, whereas 
merely 26%, or €54.3 billion, went to academic 
institutions. Therefore, around 11% of funding 
for STEM research at UK universities came 
from the EU between 2007 and 2013. Although 
the 3% of total UK R&D might be easily 
replaceable and, therefore, reasonably ignored, 
this 11% EU contribution to academic funding 
cannot be readily dismissed. The EU played a 
critical role in the funding of scientific research 
at UK universities throughout the duration 
of FP7 and, as previously demonstrated, has 
continued its critical role through Horizon 
2020. By revoking the continued ability 
to benefit so significantly from future EU 
Framework Programmes, Brexit leaves UK 
STEM higher education in a state of deficient 
funding, shifting dependency to Parliament. 
Unfortunately, because the outsized role the 
EU plays in funding academic innovation is 
hidden under the guise of a trivial 3% share, 
it risks going unnoticed by Parliament in 
their budgetary restructuring, threatening 
the continued success and prestige of UK 
universities.
 From 1995 to 2012, the money UK 
universities received for R&D compared to 
other institutional groups stayed relatively 
stagnant. The UK Office for National Statistics 
data suggest UK universities’ R&D funding 
increased only at the rate of the whole R&D 
sector. As shown in Figure 4, each sector’s 
share of government expenditure on research 
and development (GERD) remained fairly 
stable over time. During that period, higher 
education received a minimum of 14.4% and 
a maximum of 21.5% of total GERD (standard 
deviation of 1.88) (Office for National Statistics, 
2012). As such, academic spending has not 
really changed over the course of the past few 
years. Academia, however, will suffer greatly 
from Brexit. If the UK Parliament continues 
Figure 3
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its current trend after UK universities lose EU 
funding, then research at UK universities will 
suffer an institutional funding squeeze. 
 This alarming loss of funding that Brexit 
triggers is exacerbated by the fact that the 
overall UK government R&D spending has 
been, in relative terms, falling drastically on 
the world innovation stage. The UK supports 
R&D with only a small portion of its GDP. 
According to the most recent data available 
from the World Bank, in 2015, only 1.7% of the 
UK’s total GDP was spent on R&D, including 
both public and private current and capital 
expenditures. This amount placed the UK 
eighteenth, significantly behind its biggest 
EU competitors, Germany and France, and its 
biggest global competitors, the US and China 
(The World Bank, “Research…”). Moreover, 
from 1996 to 2015, the UK showed little 
significant increase in GDP expenditure on 
R&D, as shown in Figure 5 (The World Bank, 
“Research…”). This fall comes alongside a 
relatively consistent growth rate in overall 
UK GDP—the country averaged a growth of 
1.7% to 2.5% each year with the exception of a 
4.9% fall during the 2009 recession (The World 
Bank, “GDP…”). As such, the UK is making the 
task of keeping up with the rest of the world 
in scientific research, let alone continuing 
its respected position as a trailblazer, more 
difficult, putting its academic dominance, 
already threatened by the loss of EU money, 
even more at risk.
 The slipping ranking on the global 
R&D stage has been noticed by the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee, 
which has been calling for increased spending 
since as early as 2015, yet little has been done 
(Blackwood et al.). Because R&D encompasses 
such a small percentage of the total budget 
under Parliament control, it is sidelined 
by major discussions concerning bigger 
expenditures like the National Health Service. 
Yet, not expanding R&D expenditure, while 
damaging to the industrial and governmental 
sectors, will have the most noticeable effect on 
STEM research at universities. With the future 
of UK scientific research already so fragile, 
Figure 4
Composition of UK GERD by Funding Sector, 1995–2012
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and with the current power in Parliament so 
blasé about supporting scientific development, 
Brexit’s effect on UK universities has the 
potential to be profoundly devastating. And it 
is not only a funding problem.
Another Challenge of Brexit: 
Freedom of Movement
 One of the benefits of membership in the 
EU is the freedom of movement of EU citizens 
across open borders. This benefit enables 
residents of the EU-28 to travel seamlessly 
between EU countries, allowing workers to get 
jobs and students to pursue degrees in other 
EU member states. Horizon 2020 and other 
similar programs (e.g., the affiliated Marie 
Skłodowska-Curie Actions) not only fund 
research but also further facilitate the travel 
of scientists and offer limited participation to 
non-EU members. One of the necessities for 
these programs to function, even for non–
EU-28 participants like Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, is the existence of those borders 
open to free movement, something that 
Brexit threatens (Burns). Indeed, Frenk and 
colleagues (2016, p. 5) note in their analysis 
of UK scientific researcher mobility that “any 
change to the UK’s adherence to the EU free 
movement of workers principle could adversely 
affect the UK’s eligibility to take part in EU 
research funding schemes, as has been seen in 
Switzerland.” Since one of the major emphases 
of Brexit is to reduce the flow of people across 
UK borders, post-Brexit scientific international 
collaboration would be hurt by the lack of a 
truly open border.
 Depending on the exact terms of the 
divorce bill, it may become difficult for 
professors and students at all levels to gain 
entry into the UK for collaborative projects, 
fellowships, and studies. If gaining the proper 
documentation becomes too onerous, the 
number of students and visiting professors 
likely will noticeably decrease. A backlash 
against Brexit has already been seen in the 
UK’s permanent academic STEM research 
staff. Michael Arthur, Provost and President of 
University College London, a premiere research 
institution, revealed in September 2017 
that “95 [percent] of the university’s senior 
European researchers had been approached 
with job offers by other European universities” 
(Warrell). It is likely that other universities 
have experienced similar poaching. For sake 
of argument, assume this 95% of European 
professors in the UK offered jobs by other 
European universities is universally applied 
across the UK university network. Since, as 
Figure 5
Percent of GDP Contributed to R&D, 1996–2015
Source: The World Bank. “Research…”
Country 1996 2015 Change Over Time
Germany 2.133 2.877
United States 2.442 2.794
France 2.209 2.231
China 0.563 2.066
United Kingdom 1.605 1.703
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previously discussed, 16% of academic staff in 
STEM research are from the EU (Frenk et al., 
2016, p. 8), this would mean that on the order 
of 15% of STEM faculty in the UK have been 
offered jobs at EU universities. While not all 
of these offers will be accepted, and although 
this assumption is likely a bit high, if the new 
immigration policies enacted in the wake 
of Brexit substantially hinder the mobility 
researchers currently enjoy, a conceivable 
result is the exodus of a sizeable chunk of 
talented international minds from the UK, a 
modern brain drain. 
 A matching fall in EU applications to 
bachelor’s degree programs was expected in 
anticipation of Brexit, and unsurprisingly 
applications from the EU in this domain fell 
7.43% in 2017 (Weale and Barr). However, 
this downward trend does not appear to have 
continued into the 2018 application pool. As 
of the October 2017 deadline for applications 
to 2018 programs, there was actually a 
rebound, a 6% increase in applications from 
the EU for bachelor’s degree courses (UCAS, 
“Number…”). This rise came after the April 
pledge from the UK government and the 
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service 
that EU students who begin their studies in the 
UK during the 2017–2018 academic year will 
be eligible for EU costs and grants throughout 
the entirety of their bachelor’s degree course 
and that these organizations are working to 
confirm the same arrangement for students 
entering in the 2018–2019 academic year 
(UCAS, “Advising…”). Unless more funding 
becomes guaranteed after the UK officially 
leaves, and unless the new immigration laws 
allow for ease of mobility, it is likely that the 
number of undergraduate students from the 
EU will again decrease for the 2019 application 
pool and beyond. 
 The rise in EU applications during 2018 
masks another crucial symptom of the Brexit 
plague. With the fierce rise of nationalism that 
led to the Brexit vote comes the promulgation 
of an unkind message far and wide—that 
Britain is not a welcome place for foreigners. 
As such, many foreign students and professors 
have shied away from applying for positions in 
specific locations where they fear they will not 
receive a warm welcome. Many UK universities 
beyond London or outside the historical 
prestige bestowed on universities like Oxford 
and Cambridge have seen declines in rankings. 
The Times Higher Education (THE) rankings, 
a system that measures universities based on 
research strength, showed that just over half 
of the 31 UK institutions appearing in the 
2018 top 200 universities slipped in rankings, 
which Phil Baty, editorial director of the THE 
rankings, partly ascribes to Brexit inhibiting 
international talent from attending schools 
outside London and outside the most elite, 
prestigious, and historic institutions in the 
UK (Bothwell and Grove). Whether or not this 
development can be attributed to Brexit, to 
internal quarrels about chancellor pay, to the 
rise of Asian universities on the global scale, or 
to other internal aches, and whether or not this 
trend will endure in the post-Brexit era, many 
in the media openly lament that the UK’s non-
elite schools are dropping in quality (Warrell). 
With the problems that Brexit will create for 
attracting talent in the future, it is conceivable 
that many UK universities will suffer a more 
precipitous drop in ranking and consequently 
witness a diminution of scientific research 
success in the coming years.
 Apart from the shifting academic research 
workforce coming to UK universities, Brexit 
will also affect the ability of UK researchers 
to travel to EU laboratories and universities. 
Frenk and colleagues found that, between 1996 
and 2011, nearly 70% of UK researchers had 
worked abroad and subsequently published 
articles with affiliated non-UK institutions. 
Furthermore, the study found that 21% of 
scientific researchers based in the UK had 
worked abroad for two or more years during 
the same period (Frenk et al., 2016, p. 9). 
Additionally, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development notes that 
“scientists who undertake research abroad 
and return to the economy in which they 
first published contribute to raising the 
overall quality of domestic research by 20 
[percent] on average” (OECD). The numerous 
scientists from UK institutions who do go 
abroad to conduct research therefore palpably 
increase the quality of UK research. With so 
many international collaborations, so much 
access to foreign laboratories, and so much 
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benefit to the quality of domestic research 
thanks to UK researchers working abroad, 
making travel to the EU from the UK tedious 
and paperwork-laden would harm current 
and future collaborations. This is especially 
important when considering the UK’s top 
international collaborative partners. While 
the US tops the list by far, the top five round 
out with EU-28 countries—Germany, France, 
Italy, and the Netherlands (Frenk et al., 2016, 
p. 11). Brexit’s potential to hinder the ability of 
UK researchers to work easily in Europe may 
be just as damaging to UK scientific research 
as is the limiting of international talent at UK 
universities.
Conclusion
 For the myriad reasons explored in this 
article, Brexit has the potential to significantly 
disrupt the scientific prowess UK universities 
have enjoyed for so long. Funding for R&D was 
already in trouble before Brexit, and academic 
institutions in particular are set to lose a 
critical portion of their funding on exiting the 
EU. Additionally, changes in immigration laws 
likely to be included in the final divorce bill 
could significantly impede the flow of students 
and faculty across UK borders, hinder the 
formation of new international collaborations, 
and stem the level of talent working on UK-
affiliated science. Nevertheless, with the aid of 
existing and strong international interaction, 
and with some persuading in Parliament, the 
academic STEM community could continue to 
achieve its standard of excellence. 
 The scientific community in the UK has 
already begun to show the creativity of thought 
affiliated with the field and develop interesting 
work-arounds to avoid the damages of Brexit. 
In early 2018, Imperial College London, 
a globally renowned scientific institute, 
announced the launch of a new joint laboratory 
in London for mathematics in conjunction with 
France’s governmental body for research, the 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 
(CNRS). As a result, any researchers from UK 
institutions working at the new Unité Mixte 
Internationale Abraham de Moivre “will have 
the same funding status as those in France, 
even after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU” 
(Coughlan). This novel partnership, which 
came about from the connections that Imperial 
College already has through its 900 French 
staff and student members, is heralded by 
Imperial College President Alice Gast as a way 
to reinforce “Imperial’s exceptionally strong 
academic ties with France, as well as [Imperial’s] 
determination to deepen collaborations with 
European partners” (Coughlan). By bolstering 
relationships that are already strong, UK 
scientists at Imperial College have found ways 
to continue collaborating in the face of Brexit.
 Solutions to the problems Brexit poses that 
are similar to those developed by the CNRS and 
Imperial College may be easier for universities 
in the London halo or for Oxbridge, where 
their prestige and endowments will continue to 
attract international talent regardless of nearly 
any event. However, using Imperial College’s 
approach as a model, universities throughout 
the UK can leverage their existent relationships 
to tailor means for funding and collaboration to 
their own situations. Furthering collaborations 
with other countries through established 
programs like the Gates, Marshall, and Rhodes, 
which attract bright international students to 
study in the UK, and developing other similar 
programs will also help counter the negative 
effects of Brexit. 
 The last piece of the puzzle, then, is 
what the UK government can do to ensure 
the success of academia, which contributes 
2.9% of the country’s GDP each year (Jarvis 
and Hurley). In June 2017, Universities UK, 
a charity that prides itself as the “voice of 
universities” to Parliament, laid out priorities 
for the government during Brexit negotiations 
aimed at maximizing university success. 
Encompassing short-term transitional 
arrangements, exit negotiations, and domestic 
policy changes, these elements would refine 
UK immigration regimes to allow foreign 
scientists in the UK and UK scientists in the EU 
to maintain current citizenship rights, increase 
domestic funding to spur academic innovation, 
and continue UK access to European programs 
(Jarvis and Hurley). If the UK scientists 
can successfully lobby Parliament for these 
changes, then the scientific community in the 
UK will be on a good path. With hope in the 
ineffable spirit of humankind, the unwavering 
curiosity of the groundbreakers, and the 
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steadfast dedication to the improvement of life 
that is inherent to the STEM field, I believe the 
scientists of UK universities will “MacGyver” 
their way to innovation and discovery, so as to 
carry on as they always have.
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